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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

treatment of press claims since Branzburg indicates at least a reluctant
acknowledgment of the need to accord preferential status to the press where
there is no apparent compelling interest in excluding its representatives
and even where the average citizen has no general right of access. Thus, the
courts are beginning to recognize, on a case-by-case basis, a limited right
for the press of special access to newsworthy information and events.
Lynn C. Malmgren

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT -

No

WAIVER

OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IMPLIED FROM STATE'S ENTRANCE INTO A
FEDERALLY

REGULATED AREA UNLESS THERE EXISTS AN EXPRESS

PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST THE STATE.

IntracoastalTransportation,Inc. v. Decatur County (5th Cir. 1973)
A tugboat and barge, owned by Intracoastal Transportation, Inc.
(Intracoastal), laden with heavy cargo, were unable to pass beneath a
drawbridge on the Flint River in Georgia because heavy rains had caused
the river to rise. The tug signaled for the bridge to open, but the bridge
was unable to be raised because it had been paved over by the state.'
Intracoastal brought suit against Decatur County and the Georgia Department of Transportation (Georgia) 2 in federal district court,3 alleging that
the delay in delivery of the cargo resulting from the negligent operation
of the drawbridge had caused it considerable damage.4 Georgia moved to
dismiss the suit on the grounds that the state had not consented to be sued
and, therefore, the suit was precluded by the sovereign immunity defense
contained in the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution.'
On the basis of existing precedents, Intracoastal contended that since the
bridge was built on a navigable waterway and was therefore subject to the
1. Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur County, 482 F.2d 361, 363 n.2 (5th.
Cir. 1973). On oral argument it was revealed that the bridge had not been opened
for perhaps 40 years. Id.
2. It was undisputed that the suit against the Department of Transportation
was a suit against the state of Georgia. Id. at 362 n.1.
3. Since the incident occurred on a navigable waterway, the jurisdictional basis.
for the suit was 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970), which confers jurisdiction upon the federal
courts over admiralty and maritime cases.
4. 482 F.2d at 363. The district court opinion is unreported.
5. The eleventh amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any suit in lawor equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizen&
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S.
CONST. amend.
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Bridge Act of 1906 (Bridge Act), 6 the state had waived the sovereign
7
immunity defense by entering this federally regulated sphere of activity.
8
The district court agreed and denied the motion to dismiss. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and dismissed the
suit against Georgia, holding that state entrance into a federally regulated
sphere did not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity unless Congress
had provided a private cause of action for violation of the applicable
federal regulatory statute and had expressly provided that the private
remedy was applicable to the states. Intracoastal Transportation, Inc. v.
Decatur County, 482 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1973).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity developed from the English
belief that the king could not be sued in his own courts without his consent.9
A state's sovereign immunity from suit by individuals in federal court
was formally granted by the eleventh amendment to the United States
Constitution,' ° which was adopted in 1795 to overrule Chisholm v.
Georgia," in which the Supreme Court had announced that the Constitution granted federal judicial power over suits against a state by citizens
of another state. Chisholn was severely criticized, because the states feared
that vulnerability to actions on debt obligations would either bankrupt the
12
states or greatly endanger their financial stability.
Subsequently, in Hans v. Louisiana,'8 the Supreme Court held that
the eleventh amendment precluded a nonconsensual suit in federal court
against a state by one of its own citizens.1 4 However, the Court further
found that the amendment did not make a federal forum completely unavailable to one who wished to sue a state, because the state could expressly

6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 491 et seq. (1970).
Bridge Act) provides:

Section 5 of the Bridge Act of 1906 (the

It shall be the duty of all persons owning, operating, and tending . . . drawbridges . . . built across navigable rivers . . . to open . . . the draws . . . for the
passage of vessels . . . . Every such person who shall wilfully fail or refuse to
open . . . the draws after reasonable signal shall have been given . . . shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $2,000 nor less than $1,000, or by imprisonment . . . not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court ....
Id. § 499.
7. 482 F.2d at 363. A discussion of the basis for this contention appears in the
text following note 21 infra.
8. Id.
9. Comment, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. CHI.
L. REV. 331 (1966). See 69 DIcK. L. REV. 270, 271-72 (1965).
10. See note 5 supra.
11. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
12. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV.

L.

REV.

1, 19-20 (1963).

13. 134 U.S.1 (1889).
14. Id. at 12. This interpretation of the eleventh amendment disregards its clear
ilanguage. The Court justified its holding by noting that a literal interpretation of the
-Constitution in Chisholm led the Court to a decision that provoked such a violent
reaction that an amendment was adopted to overrule it. The Court thus reasoned
,that a literal interpretation of the amendment was undesirable. Id. at 12-15.
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or impliedly consent to such a suit,' 5 although consent was not to be
readily inferred. 16 Furthermore, the Court later held that a state's
intention to waive sovereign immunity did not constitute consent to be
sued in federal court, absent a clear declaration by the state that it wished
to submit to courts other than those of its own creation. 1
Any analysis of the question of whether or not a state has waived
its immunity from suit in federal court must begin with Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Commission.'5 In Petty, the Court held that by entering
into and acting under a congressionally approved agreement that contained
a sue-and-be-sued clause, a state waived whatever immunity was provided
by the eleventh amendment. 19 Petty indicated that Congress could expressly condition a state's entry into a federally regulated area upon
waiver of the sovereign immunity defense. 20 It did not, however, answer
the question of whether an implied waiver could be found if Congress had
not expressly conditioned such entry upon the state's consent to be sued
in federal court.
The issue of an implied waiver was present in Parden v. Terminal
Railway, 2 ' although the Court did not squarely address the issue of an implied waiver upon mere entry into a federally regulated area. In that case,
employees of an Alabama-owned railroad sued the railroad under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 22 which permitted suits in
23
federal court by employees against their common carrier employers.
The Court held that since the FELA applied to all interstate common carriers, Alabama, by owning and operating a common carrier that engaged in
interstate commerce, had consented to the suit and had waived the
24
sovereign immunity defense.

15. Id. at 16. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933). The Court in Fiske
stated that the eleventh amendment merely granted to the states a privilege which
could be waived. Id. at 24. Note, however, that the language of the amendment does
not require such an interpretation. The amendment modifies article III of the Constitution and can thus be read as part of that article. This interpretation would
preclude the possibility of waiver, because by waiver the parties would be conferring
subject-matter jurisdiction where it had not been granted by the Constitution. Although
this issue has not been directly addressed by the Court, it apparently has been assumed
that waiver of the eleventh amendment defense does not confer extraconstitutional
jurisdiction. See Comment, supra note 9, at 334-36.
16. Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909).
17. Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591 (1904).
18. 359 U.S. 275 (1959). In Petty, the plaintiff's husband was employed on a
ferryboat by the defendant commission, which was formed by a congressionally
approved compact between Missouri and Tennessee. He was killed when the ferryboat sank. The plaintiff sued claiming negligence. Id. at 278.
19. Id. at 281-82.
20. Id. at 282.
21. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
22. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
23. Id. §§ 51, 56. For the text of these sections, see note 34 infra.
24. 377 U.S. at 187-88.
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While Parden appeared to limit the effect of the eleventh amendment
when a state engaged in activity regulated by federal statute, 25 Emplo'yees
of the Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public
Health & Welfare26 revealed that the amendment retained broad applicability. 27 In Employees, state hospital workers sued the state for unpaid

overtime wages and an equal amount in liquidated damages pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).28 The plaintiffs alleged
that the 1966 amendments to the FLSA made the act applicable to state
employers, 29 and that since Missouri had violated the act, plaintiffs could
assert their rights in a federal forum. 30 The Court held that mere entrance
by a state into a federally regulated sphere did not constitute waiver of
the sovereign immunity defense. 8' Parden was distinguished on the
grounds that it involved a proprietary activity, rather than a governmental one as in Employees,3 2 and that it concerned a suit by a small class
of plaintiffs which, unlike the suit in Employees, would not have a significant
impact on the state treasury.33 As a further ground of distinction, the
34
Court noted that different statutes were involved in each situation.
Despite these significant differences between Parden and Employees,
the Intracoastal court attempted to synthesize them by declaring that
25. See Comment, supra note 9, at 345.
26.
27.
28.
29.

411 U.S. 279 (1973).
See 17 VILL. L. REV. 713, 727 (1972).
29 U.S.C. §§ 201 etseq. (1970).
The term "employer" was at first defined to exclude any state or subdivision

thereof. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 3, 52 Stat. 1060. However by the 1966
amendment, Congress made the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) applicable to
"employees of a State or a political subdivision thereof, employed . . . in a hospital,
institution, or school .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970).
30. 411 U.S. at 281.
31. Id. at 285.
32. Id. at 284-85.
33. Id. at 279. See note 68 infra.
34. 411 U.S. at 283. Section 1 of the FELA, which was involved in Parden,
provided that:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any
of the several states . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury
while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce ....
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970). Section 6 of the FELA further provides that "an action may
be brought in a district court of the United States . . . ...Id. § 56.
In Employees, the relevant FLSA provision provided that:
Any employer who violates . . . [the Act] shall be liable to the employee
or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid overtime compensation ...
and in an additional equal amount of liquidated damages ....
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970). Justice Brennan, dissenting in Employees, argued that
the differences between the FELA and the FLSA did not render Employees distinguishable from Parden. He continued:
But the lawsuits have in common that each is an action for damages in federal
court brought against a State by citizens of the State in its employ under the
authority of a regulatory statute founded on the Commerce Clause. Parden held
that a federal court determination of such suits cannot be precluded by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity because the States surrendered their sovereignty
to that extent when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce.
411 U.S. at 299.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/7
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together the two cases required that three factors be present before a court
could imply a state's consent to a suit in federal court by a private party:
First, the state must have entered a field regulated by federal statutes. 35
Second, Congress, through the regulation, must have "specifically created
a remedy in private parties for violation of the applicable federal regulatory
statute."36 Third, the private party litigant "must show that Congress
expressly provided that the private remedy [was] applicable to the
States."87
When considered seriatim, the Intracoastal court's interpretations of
what Parden and Employees each required before a waiver of the sovereign
immunity defense may be implied was a reasonable interpretation of those
cases. Such an implied waiver was found in Parden because the state had
entered into a federally regulated sphere of activity and the federal regulation specifically created a private right of action under the statute.38 In
Empldyees, too, the state had entered into a federally regulated sphere of
activity and the federal regulation specifically created a private right of
action under the statute. However, no implied waiver was found in
Employees because the Supreme Court determined that Congress had not
expressly provided that the private remedy was applicable to the states.39
The Intracoastal court recognized that Parden and Employees involved different factual situations. 40 However, instead of making a determination as to which of these cases should be regarded as controlling in the
instant case, the court assumed that all three of the above-mentioned
requirements had to be met before an implied waiver of sovereign immunity could be found. The court held that the first Parden requirement
had been satisfied because by building a bridge over a navigable waterway,
Georgia had entered a sphere of activity that was regulated by a federal
statute.41 However, the court found that the Bridge Act did not specifically
provide a private right of action, and, therefore, Georgia could not be
held to have waived its defense of sovereign immunity - the second
Parden requirement had not been satisfied.4 2 While the Fifth Circuit did
35. 482 F.2d at 364.

36. Id. Use of the word "specifically" led to confusion when the court applied
the second requirement to the Intracoastalfacts. See notes 58-61 and accompanying
text infra.
37. 482 F.2d at 365. The first two requirements were derived from Parden, while
the third is the court's interpretation of the holding of Employees.
38. These two requirements are herein referred to respectively as the first and
second Pardenrequirements.
39. The requirement that the private remedy be found to be expressly applicable

to the states is herein referred to as the Employees requirement.

40. 482 F.2d at 365.
41. The court found that the Bridge Act regulated the construction of the drawbridge. Id. at 363, 365.
42. The court determined that the Bridge Act did not specifically provide a
private right of action, because it was "penal in nature and enforcement of its provisions [was] vested in the Attorney General." Id. at 366. Since it held that the
second requirement had not been met, the court found it unnecessary to discuss the
third requirement. Id.
Published by
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not directly discuss the Employees requirement that the private party
must show that Congress expressly made the private remedy available
against a state, it did tacitly apply this requirement to distinguish cases
which tended to indicate that the second Parden requirement had been
met. It found cases which suggested that a private right of action did
exist under the Bridge Act to be inapposite because they had not involved
43
suits against a state in federal court.
The court first discussed Neches Coal Co. v. Miller & Vidor Lumber
Co.4 4 In that case the plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the construction of
a dam to preserve a city's drinking water supply, which construction
interfered with its water rights, claiming that the defendants had violated the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (Rivers Act) .4 5 The
court therein had held that a private party could utilize the remedy given
46
by the Rivers Act and permitted the suit to proceed.
Although Neches involved a suit under the Rivers Act, it was relevant
to Intracoastal because, while the Rivers and Bridges Acts regulate different matters, 47 their enforcement clauses are similar. 48 This close similarity in the language of the respective enforcement clauses suggests that
if a private right of action exists under the Rivers Act, one should also
be found to exist under the Bridge Act.
The Intracoastalcourt, however, limited Neches to its facts because
of the "constitutional complexion" of the instant case. 49 The court stated
that Neches could not apply to Intracoastal because the former case arose
under the Rivers Act, because it involved a suit between private parties
whereas Intracoastal involved a suit by a private party against a state,
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 366-67 & n.14. See notes 44-50, 52-55 and accompanying text infra.
24 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1928).
33 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970).
24 F.2d at 765.
47. The Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 (Rivers Act) protects
navigable waters and river improvements generally. 33 U.S:C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970).
The Bridge Act deals specifically with the construction, maintenance, and operation
of bridges. 33 U.S.C. §§ 491 et seq. (1970).
48. Section 12 of the Rivers Act provides:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate any provisions . . .
of this title . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less than $500, or by
imprisonment . . . not exceeding one year, or by both such punishments, in the
discretion of the court ...
33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970). For the text of the relevant provisions of the Bridge Act,
see note 6 supra.
49. 482 F.2d at 366 n.14. How the "constitutional complexion" of Intracoastal the single additional fact that it involved the eleventh amendment - affected the
applicability of Neches was never explained by the court. The issue before the court
was whether the Bridge Act provided a private right of action. Since Neches held
that the Rivers Act provided such a right, the court should have decided whether the
virtual identity of the enforcement clauses of the two acts compelled a conclusion
that such a right also existed under the Bridge Act. The "constitutional complexion"
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/7
of the case was therefore irrelevant.
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and because the many equitable considerations present in Neches were
absent in Intracohstal.50
A close analysis, however, reveals that these distinctions are not
valid. In discussing Neches, the Intracoastalcourt was considering whether
or not the second Parden requirement had been met. Parden did not
require that the private right of action under the statute be applicable to
the states; it merely required that there exist a private right under the
statute. By distinguishing Neches on the basis that it did not involve a
suit against a state, the instant court was, in reality, erroneously applying
the third requirement created by Employees."'
The instant court expressly rejected the result of the second of the
three cases suggesting the existence of a private right of action under the
Bridge Act, ChesapeakeBay Bridge & Tunnel Dist. v. Lauritzen,52 wherein
the Fourth Circuit held that the Rivers Act created a cause of action in
private parties. 53 The Intracoastal court disputed the conclusion of the
Lauritzen court on the basis that the result was not supported by the cases
50. Id. The court did not make clear what the "equitable considerations" in
Neches were. Since one of the defendants in that case was being enjoined from
building a dam that was designed to protect the city's drinking water supply, 24 F.2d
at 764, it would appear that the equities would have been against implying a private
right of action under the Rivers Act.
The Intracoastal court stated that there were no "equitable considerations in
the instant case." 482 F.2d at 366 n.14. Indeed, the fact that the plaintiffs should have
known that the drawbridge could not be raised, as it had been paved over for 40 years
(see note 1 supra), arguably would have been a factor in support of the court's
ultimate conclusion had it remained consistent in its analysis.
51. 482 F.2d at 366 n.14. The error of this reasoning becomes apparent if it is
assumed, for illustration, that no court has ever implied a private right of action
against a state under a federal regulatory statute, but that several courts have implied
the right against private parties. It would be impossible to show by judicial decision
that the second Parden requirement was met by implication, because whenever a case
implying the right of action against a private party was offered to show that such a
right existed, the court could distinguish it because it did not involve a suit against
a state. This would appear to merge the second Parden requirement and the Employees
test. Yet, the Intracoastal court declared that they were separate requirements. 482
F.2d at 365. The second Parden requirement is that there be Congressional provision
of a private right of action. If the Employees requirement that the right of action
be made expressly applicable against a state differs from the second Parden requirement, the fact that the state is a defendant would be important only to an analysis
of whether the Employees requirement were met. As to the issue of whether a private
right of action existed under the Bridge Act, the question of against whom the action
is brought was irrelevant. Such an application of the second Parden requirement
would appear to demand that the private right of action be expressly provided by
the statute, because if judicial decision cannot imply a private right of action, the
only way a state could be sued under a federal statute would be by express statutory
provision. Such an interpretation is a drastic alteration of the second Parden requirement. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text infra.
52. 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968).
53. Id. at 1004. In Lauritzen, a Danish ship had suffered hull damage when it
was snagged by a submerged obstruction at the bridge-tunnel spanning the Chesapeake
Bay. Id. at 1002. See also Adams v. Harris County, 316 F. Supp. 938, 947-49 (S.D.
Tex. 1970). But see Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. Department of Transp., 423
F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1970); Mobile Towing Co. v. M/V Weatherly, 343 F. Supp. 276,
278by(S.D.
Ala.University
1971). Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
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relied upon, particularly Morania Barge No. 140, Inc. v. M & T Tracy,
Inc.5 4 The Intracoastal court found Morania unsupportive of the conclusion that a private right of action existed under the Rivers Act because
it read Morania merely to stand for the proposition "that the standards
established in the Rivers Act may be used in a suit where independent
55
jurisdiction already exists."
This distinction, however, is not persuasive, because the presence or
absence of a private right of action under a regulatory statute depends
upon the language of the statute, not upon whether independent jurisdiction of a federal court exists. The proper focus should be upon whether
the plaintiff can sue under the act. In any event, the Intracoastal court
never explained the relationship between a regulatory statute's provision
of a private right of action and the existence of jurisdiction. Moreover,
the validity of the court's distinction is further called into question when
one considers the fact that Intracoastalinvolved a suit in admiralty which
was the basis of jurisdiction in Morania.56 The fact that the state, rather
than a private party, was the defendant in Intracoastal should have had
no bearing upon the issue of whether the Bridge Act provided a private
right of action. That factor relates only to the question of whether the
defense of sovereign immunity is available. Mdrania, therefore, is not distinguishable on the basis set forth by the Intracoastal court, and if Morania
is valid, Lauritzen is valid as well. The court in the instant case should
have concluded that the Bridge Act fulfilled the second Parden requirement,
and then proceeded to discuss whether the third requirement imposed by
Employees had been met.

54. 312 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1962). In Morania, a barge was damaged when it struck
a second, sunken barge owned by the defendant. The sunken barge was unmarked in
violation of section 15 of the Rivers Act, 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1970), and the owner of
the damaged barge sued claiming dereliction of the statutory duty imposed by the act.
312 F.2d at 80-81. The court applied the standard of care supplied by the Rivers Act.
Id. at 80.
The district court in Lauritzen also cited United States v. Perma Paving Co.,
332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964), for the proposition that the Rivers Act, although penal
in nature, implied a private right of action. Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel Dist. v.
Lauritzen, 259 F. Supp. 633, 638 (E.D. Va. 1966). In Perina Paving, the United
States sued a riparian landowner for the cost of dredging a portion of a navigable
channel obstructed by the landowner in violation of the Rivers Act. 332 F.2d at 756.
The Intracoastal court determined that the Perma Paving court, by construing the
Rivers Act to give the United States a cause of action against a state for violation
of the act, did not hold that the act provides a cause of action for private parties.
482 F.2d at 367 n.16. This analysis is persuasive, because the regulatory effect of the
Rivers Act depends in great measure upon the ability of the United States to enforce
it against a state; therefore, to have held otherwise would have rendered the
act ineffectual.
55. 482 F.2d at 367 n.16. In Morania, there was independent jurisdiction because
it was a suit in admiralty (see note 3 supra). 312 F.2d at 79. The Fifth Circuit,
however, offered no support for its view that this factor was critical to the holding
in that case.
56. See notes 3 & 55 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/7
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As the dissent in Intracoastal noted, "[p]rivate civil remedies have
been implied from federal statutes beginning in 1916." 57 In a similar
vein, it has never been held that the penal nature of a statute necessarily
precludes the finding of an implied right of action under that statute. The
majority, however, stated that "Congress must have expressly created a
remedy in private parties for violation of the applicable federal regulatory
statute."58 Such an interpretation would be a severe limitation upon what
the court declared to be the second requirement for an implied waiver of
the sovereign immunity defense, i.e. that "Congress has specifically created
a remedy in private parties for the violation of the applicable federal
regulatory statute."5' 9 If it be conceded arguendo that "expressly" and
"specifically" are synonymous, 60 the court should have determined whether
there were reasons to imply a private right of action when a private citizen
sued another private citizen that would not justify such an interpretation
when a private citizen sued a state in federal court. The court did not
address this issue. Yet, conceptually, it would seem correct to conclude
that if a statute provides either an express or implied right of action,
the right of action exists regardless of the identity of the defendant. 6 '
It is submitted, therefore, that the court should have found that an implied
private right of action did exist under the Bridge Act, and, according to
its stated analytical approach, determined whether the Employees requirement had been satisfied. Had this been done, the suit would have been
57. 482 F.2d at 371 (Wisdom, J., dissenting), citing Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) ; J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916);
Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv.
285 (1963).
The Supreme Court in the recent case of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974), noted that while it had authorized private suits "in order to effectuate a
statutory purpose," it had never done so in an eleventh amendment context wherein
the state was the defendant. Id. at 673-74. Edelman involved a fact situation clearly
distinguishable from that presented by the instant case. In Edelman, the state had
merely participated in a federally assisted aid program and had failed to comply with
the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
an administrative agency. Thus, in Edelman, no statutory regulation comparable to
the Bridge Act was involved and even the first Parden requirement for waiver
could not have been met. The Edelman Court refused to imply a waiver of the
sovereign immunity defense and discussed Parden and Employees only in passing.
Id. at 671-72.
58. 482 F.2d at 366 n.14 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
60. The words "expressly" and "specifically" are conceptually distinct. "Expressly" refers to articulation and communication. See WFBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 899 (2d ed. 1946). "Specifically" refers to the scope of the
communication. Id. at 2415. There can be specific expressions and specific implications. Thus, it is not clear whether the court's conclusion is that the Bridge Act did
not specifically imply a private right of action or whether it is that the act did not
expressly so provide. It is clear, however, that the act does not expressly provide a
private right of action, and if the Parden criterion is that an express provision is
required, the instant court's conclusion that the second Parden requirement was not
met is correct.
61. See note
51 and
accompanying
textofsupra.
Published by Villanova
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dismissed because the Bridge Act does not expressly provide that a private
right of action against a state defendant exists for violations of its provisions.
However, this does not mean that the Intracoastal court reached the
correct result for the wrong reason. The preceding analysis presumed the
propriety of the court's analytical approach in reading Parden and
Employees as containing separate requirements to be applied to the same
factual situation. 2 It is submitted that such an approach is improper as it
3
ignores significant distinctions that exist between Parden and Employees.
The first significant distinction is one which may be labelled the
proprietary-governmental distinction. In Parden, the state activity, operation of a railroad for profit, was proprietary ;64 the state was acting not as
sovereign, but as a private party. Since no sovereign immunity defense is

available to a private party, the state, by entering into an area regulated
by a federal statute under which a right of action existed, could be held to
have implicitly consented to suit in federal court. Employees, on the other
hand, involved the operation of state mental hospitals, a fundamentally
62. 482 F.2d at 365. The Intracoastalcourt apparently applied both Parden and
Employees. But an analysis of Employees reveals that the Parden criteria are implicit
within those applied in Employees. In Employees, there was state activity in an area
over which Congress had exercised regulatory control, and a private right of action
under a federal regulatory statute existed. Thus, Intracoastal may have been merely
applying the Employees criteria.
63. Two distinctions suggested by the Eighth Circuit in the Employees case and
affirmed by the Supreme Court without discussion, may be dismissed. First, the court
attempted to distinguish Parden on the basis that in the latter, a failure to imply
state consent to be sued would have left the plaintiffs, employees of state owned
railroads, without a remedy. In Employees, on the other hand, the plaintiffs had at
least two other avenues of relief. Employees of the Dep't of Public Health & Welfare
v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 826 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd,
411 U.S. 279 (1973).
This distinction bears no logical relationship to the implied waiver issue
because waiver depends upon the nature of the state's activities and intent of Congress.
Even if it is assumed that this distinction is valid, it would indicate that Employees
should have been controlling in Intracoastalsince the court noted that other remedies
were available. 482 F.2d at 362-63 n.1.
The other distinction suggested by the court of appeals in Employees is
predicated upon a resolution of the issue of whether the state had entered a sphere
of federal activity at a time when Congress had enacted legislation in the area. 452
F.2d at 827. In Parden, Alabama began operating the railroad 20 years after the
FELA was passed, whereas in Employees the state activity was being conducted long
before the FLSA was amended to control it. The force of this distinction is diminished
when one considers that if the area in which the state activity is conducted is currently
subject to federal regulation, it was always, at least potentially, subject to such regulation and a state can be said to have consented to the in futuro federal regulation
when it entered. Therefore, to bring this notion to bear upon the instant case, since
Congress has always had the power to control admiralty matters and to regulate
interstate commerce, upon entering such areas the state subjected itself to federal
regulation, despite the fact that there had been no specific exercise of federal powers
at the time. Such entrance into a field subject to federal regulation should be construed to imply consent to be subject to federal regulation when and if it is exercised.
Consequently, the particular chronology of events in a particular case should be
irrelvant to its decision. Secondly, continuation of an activity after federal regulation
has been exercised in the area may itself imply consent to be governed by such
regulation. See 17 VILL. L. REV. 713, 720 (1972).
64. 377 U.S. at 185.
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governmental activity.6 5 When acting in a governmental capacity, the
state acts as sovereign and merely engaging in the activity cannot operate
as implied consent to a suit in federal court. A second ground for distinguishing the two cases arises from the fact that in Parden five employees sought compensation for individual personal injuries.65 As such,
it involved individual suits with individual factual circumstances, not subject to a class action. Therefore, such actions under the FELA could not
have had a far-reaching impact upon the subject state's treasury. The very
reason for the adoption of the eleventh amendment - to protect state
financial stability67 - underscores the importance of this factor. In contrast, the Employees suit was brought by a large class of state employees
seeking overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated damages
and attorneys' fees. 68
Close analysis of these distinctions between Parden and Employees
reveals that Intracoastaldoes not fit fully within either of those cases. By
constructing and maintaining a bridge over the Flint River, Georgia was
merely performing the same governmental function it performed when it
constructed and maintained state roads and highways. To this extent,
Employees would appear to be controlling. Instead of being a case involving a suit for double damages which would have had serious fiscal
ramifications, however, the suit in Intracoastal was brought by a single
plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for an injury caused by Georgia's
allegedly negligent violation of a federal statute.6 9 Consequently, the court
should have determined which of these cases was controlling in the factual
situation presented in Intracoastal rather than taking the approach that
70
it did.
It is submitted that a proper resolution of the instant controversy
required a balancing of the distinguishing aspects of those cases in order
to determine their relative importance in an Intracoastal-type situation. It
is therefore further submitted that through such an approach the court
would have reached the conclusion that, since the state had entered a
sphere of activity that was regulated by a federal statute which provided
for a private right of action, the defense of sovereign immunity had been
waived.
The Intracoastal court should have determined that Parden, rather
than Employees, was controlling in the following manner. The basis of
the governmental-proprietary activity factor is that when a state acts as a
65. See 411 U.S. at 281.
66. 377 U.S. at 184. Four suits involving five injured parties were consolidated in
Parden. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 311 F.2d 727, 728 n.2 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 377
U.S. 184 (1964).
67. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
68. 411 U.S. at 281. The Employees Court noted that 2.7 million state employees
would be affected by the suit. Id. at 287.
69. 482 F.2d at 363.
70. Had the Intracoastal court properly determined that Employees and not
Parden was controlling precedent and applied the same analytical technique, it would
indeed
have reached
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sovereign, it cannot be sued without its consent. Since this basis is purely
theoretical, it is submitted that it should not be given controlling force;
the eleventh amendment was adopted not to protect the inherent rights
of a sovereign, but to achieve the very practical objective of securing state
71
financial stability by precluding suit against a state on debt obligations.
Moreover, the governmental-proprietary distinction is not functional in
terms of the purposes of the eleventh amendment. 72 The fiscal impact
distinction, on the other hand, has both practical and historical significance.
It reflects a concern for governmental solvency that lies at the very foundation of the eleventh amendment. 73 Therefore, it would appear that when
the theoretical governmental-proprietary distinction runs counter to the
practical fiscal impact factor, it must give way to practicality in order that
injured parties might be compensated.
The Supreme Court has indicated agreement with this view. In
Maryland v. Wirtz, 74 which established the constitutionality of the FLSA
amendments involved in Employees, the Court stated that "the Federal
Government, when acting within a delegated power, may override countervailing state interests whether these be described as 'governmental' or
'proprietary' in character. ' 75 The Employees opinion itself supports this
interpretation. The Court indicated that Congress can act to regulate
state governmental activities and that when Congress so acts, enormous
fiscal burdens may be placed upon the states.76 The Court declared that
"Congress acting responsibly would not be presumed to take such action
silently."' 77 In other words, when the activity is governmental in nature
and an implied waiver of sovereign immunity will have a severe impact
on state treasuries, waiver of the eleventh amendment defense will be
implied only if Congress has expressly indicated that such an implication
is proper. In Intracoastal,only the governmental activity aspect was present,
as the impact of the plaintiff's recovery upon the state's coffers would have
been de minimis. Therefore, Parden should have controlled; thus, if there
had been state entrance into a federally regulated area and a private right
of action existed under the statute, the sovereign immunity defense would
78
have been deemed to have been waived.
71. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
72. In another area where the governmental-proprietary distinction has been
significant - determining whether there should be compensation by the state for the
taking of local government property - one commentator has expressed dissatisfaction
with this distinction primarily because of the difficulty in classifying government
functions as governmental or proprietary. Dau, Problems in Condemnation of Property
Devoted to Public Use, 44 TEXAs L. REV. 1517, 1527-30 (1966).
73. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
74. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
75. Id. at 195.
76. 411 U.S. at 284-85.
77. Id.
78. According to the Parden Court, "By empowering Congress to regulate commerce, then, [by ratification of the Constitution] the states necessarily surrendered any
portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation." 377
U.S. at 192. Thus, "when a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and
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Arguably, as a result of the instant case Parden and Employees can
be harmonized. The suggested analysis of those cases, however, reveals
that they apply to different factual situations. When an action against a
state under a federal regulatory statute will not have a substantial impact
upon the state treasury, there is no reason to insulate the state from
liability for its acts. The party alleging the injury should be presented
the opportunity to try his claim in a federal forum. Waiver of the sovereign
immunity defense should be implied if the statute under which the action
is brought provides a private right of action, whether express or implied.
However, when the action brought will have a material, deleterious effect
upon the state treasury, the purpose of the eleventh amendment and the
policy of promoting harmonious federalism dictate that no waiver of
sovereign immunity be implied unless Congress has clearly manifested the
intent that a state's entrance into a federally regulated area is conditioned
upon the state's consent to be sued in federal court.79
Anthony A. DeSabato
enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that
regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation." Id. at 196. The
dissent in Employees stated that the role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in a
democracy is suspect. In the words of Justice Brennan:
In a nation whose ultimate sovereign is the people and not government, a
doctrine premised upon kingship - or, as has been suggested, "on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends," - is indefensible.
411 U.S. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Kawanankoa v. Polybank, 205
U.S. 349, 353 (1907). Recently, New Jersey's Attorney General echoed this idea:
"The growing recognition that the basic unfairness of the State's refusal to permit

itself to be sued when its actions result in injury to innocent third parties has become
an impelling force for change."
IMMUNITY at 7 (May 1972).

REP. OF THE ATT'Y GEN. TAsK FORCE ON

SOVEREIGN

This same view was articulated by the dissent in Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), when it was stated that "governmental Immunity
runs counter to prevailing notions of reason and justice." Id. at 709 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). In light of these sound policy considerations, the Intracoastal court
should have construed the waiver theory more broadly than it did, and limited the
availability of the defense of sovereign immunity.
79. Objection to this approach might be raised upon equal protection grounds,
the argument being that to allow only one of two similarly situated parties to sue,
such decision being based wholly upon the dollar amount of the respective claims,
would constitute an invidious discrimination made for patently arbitrary reasons. It is
beyond the scope of this note to explore the complexities of and possible results which
might flow from such objections. However, it is appropriate to note that classifications based wholly upon dollar amounts are not unknown. Indeed, in Swarb v. Lennox,
405 U.S. 191 (1972), the Supreme Court of the United States approved a lower
court's scheme whereby Pennsylvania cognovit provisions were presumed invalid as
to people with incomes less than $10,000, but not as to those with incomes greater
than $10,000.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974

13

